Thursday, 27 June 2013

The dirty hand of Qatar in Sudan’s conflicts



The dirty hand of Qatar in Sudan’s conflicts


Dr. Anne Bartlett is Professor of Sociology and Director of the Graduate Program in International Studies at the University of San Francisco.
She may be reached at albartlett@usfca.edu


June 20, 2013 

There is a certain intractability to Sudan’s conflicts these days, which defies logic or, it seems, any moral responsibility. The inability to move the international community off its course of pandering to Khartoum’s interests seems both irrational and unreasonable, given the significant upsurge in violence in Darfur and the critical situation now facing the population in Blue Nile and South Kordofan. Consider what would happen if any government elsewhere (let’s say North Korea, for example), had the temerity to actually cross borders, drop bombs on innocent people, blatantly shut off oil supplies and sponsor militias to purposefully create instability in a neighboring country. In such a case, the whole world would be up in arms, diplomatic secure phones would be buzzing with telephone traffic and condemnation would be both swift and decisive.

Yet, when it comes to South Sudan and the rights of marginalized people inside Sudan, anything goes. The Sudanese government can cause havoc, force people to work like slaves in gold mines in Darfur, starve local communities who are now corralled in camps, oversee non-existent health provision leading to the worst global outbreak of yellow fever in decades and terrorize people in the Jebel Marra to within an inch of their lives. A wanted war criminal, Ali Kushayb, can drive around as Commander of the Central Reserve Forces (known as Abu Tira) in South Darfur with no sanction at all. In South Kordofan and Blue Nile, the government can block humanitarian access, shell local populations and purposely locate itself close to civilian populations in towns like Kadugli so as to create maximum civilian casualties. Being even handed in its dispersal of war criminals, it can install Ahmed Haroun as the Governor of South Kordofan who is currently busy hosting football championships, while also overseeing the murder of innocent people.

The big question is why the silence? Why is the international community so compliant with the Sudanese government while all this unspeakable horror is going on? Why are they so full of what needs to happen elsewhere in the world, while apparently so blind to the rights of the people of Sudan? Why can Obama stand in Berlin talking about freedom and the horrors of the Stasi, while being unconcerned about the horrors of the NISS and indicted war criminals? Why are certain dictators worthy of US attention, while others aren’t?

The answer of course lies in the dirty hand of Qatar in world geopolitics. Across the world today Qatar is so busy in trading its cash for influence in world affairs, that it has been able to compromise the diplomatic credibility of the USA, UK, much of Europe and North Africa. It has been doing this quietly by using its relationships with the likes of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, to shine its credentials of having some control over the Muslim Brotherhood and the ikhwan influence that is fast spreading across the Sahel. It has been doing so at the expense of its neighbors in the Gulf, notably the UAE, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and also at the expense of people suffering inside Sudan, who, it appears, have no rights at all.

Buying its way into the hearts of governments across the world, Qatar has set its sights high. In the United Kingdom, it has agreed to invest more than £10 billion in infrastructure projects that include energy plants, road and rail projects and even the new ‘super-sewer’ project under the capital, London. Elsewhere in London, Qatar has recently invested in Harrods, the Shard skyscraper and Heathrow Airport. Outside the capital, discussions are also underway to fund a new £14 billion nuclear reactor at Hinkley Point in Somerset, planned and operated by EDF, the French energy giant.

Not wishing to lose out on Qatar’s largesse, France has also agreed to allow the Emirate to invest millions in its depressed ‘banlieues’ – the rings of poor suburbs with high immigrant populations that surround Paris. What was originally slated to be an exclusively Qatari project was however not taken up by Sarkozy due to the pressure of impending elections. It was however later adapted by François Hollande to include a joint plan between the French government, French private sector and the Qatari government, after accusations that the plan could amount to an ‘Islamic Trojan Horse’ being allowed deep into the heart of depressed Muslim areas. Undeterred the Qataris have continued to work on the issue, promoting a sixty five million dollar fund for young entrepreneurs from these areas. They have also bought football clubs, hotels, office buildings and public companies.

This pattern of influence trading and soft power usage spans much of Europe, including bailouts to the Greek government, interest in privatizing the defense giant Hellenic Defense Systems and buying six of its islands. In Germany the ‘Aamal Company, one of the Gulf region’s fastest growing diversified conglomerates, has signed an agreement with Vivantes International Medicine, the biggest hospital group in Germany, to create a joint venture (JV) outpatient medical centre in Doha’. In a spirit of reciprocity, Qatar is also investing in property and the leisure industry in Berlin.

In the USA, the Emir has developed strong relationships on account of the Defense Cooperation Agreement, which moved the U.S. Combat Air Operations Center for the Middle East from Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia to Qatar’s Al Udeid airbase south of Doha, the Qatari capital. Udeid and other facilities in Qatar now serve as logistics, command, and basing hubs for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations, including Iraq and Afghanistan’. Education city, Doha, now hosts six top US universities: Georgetown, Carnegie Mellon, Northwestern, Cornell, Texas A&M and Virginia Commonwealth. US think tanks such as the Brookings Institution also call Doha home. Working closely with Qatar on the current crisis in Syria, the US is also developing strong diplomatic relationships with the Emirate as it moves forward.

Qatar’s spiderlike web of influence is growing at a rapid pace and spreading across the globe. The fact that Qatar has the ear, and has cultivated relations of dependence with many western governments, means that it has a lot of leverage in the case of Darfur, not only to keep pushing the Doha Peace Process as the only game in town, but also to ensure continued support for the Sudanese government and its operations. Elsewhere it can keep the pressure on the government of South Sudan and on the so called ‘rebel’ movements like the SRF operating on the border, while turning attention away from Sudan’s own sponsorship of militias inside South Sudan.

The question is how ill-informed and self-interested the world community can get. Are they so entranced by Qatar’s message that they have failed to notice the fact that the Emirate is speaking out of both sides of its mouth? Do they really think that once they’ve bought into Qatar’s influence over the Muslim Brotherhood, that it will end there? Are they too lazy to look a little further down the road to see what might be heading in their direction? Yes, it is easy to hit the soft targets like South Sudan and the already pulverized people of Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Yes, it is easy to sell innocent people out in exchange for economic benefit and fat cat deals. However, getting too involved with such a government, as they will soon find out, can be rather unpredictable. As with so many situations where people get into bed with the devil, the international community had better pay attention to who they will wake up with in the morning.

Monday, 17 June 2013

REDRESS : Sudan Law Reform Advocacy Briefing


REDRESS

Sudan Law Reform Advocacy Briefing

May 2013



This Briefing will be published quarterly to highlight and reflect on development and issues critical to the promotion and protection of human rights in Sudan. Its aim is to inform and engage those working on, and interested in, law reform and human rights in Sudan. The present issue focuses on the prohibition of torture; it identifies shortcomings in Sudan’s legal regime and recommends a series of changes, drawing on an alternative report submitted by REDRESS, the African Centre on Justice and Peace Studies and the Democracy First Group to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 2012 (seehttp://www.redress.org/download/publications/1204%20Comments%20to%20Sudans%204th%20and%205th%20Periodic%20Report.pdf). The annex contains key extracts from the concluding observations of the Commission, which Sudan is bound to implement as a state party to the African Charter. The issue also contains a list of reports recently published by international and regional organisations, NGOs and others.


I. Implementing the Prohibition of Torture in Sudan

The prevalence of torture in Sudan is a long - standing concern. In the wake of the end of the Interim Period of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the separation of the country in 2011, the human rights situation has deteriorated, characterised by the outbreak and intensification of armed conflicts, as well as repression of protests and civil society.

Recourse to torture continues unabated, and there are a series of well documented cases of torture by national security agents and others targeting political opponents, human rights defenders, students, and members of marginalised communities.

Sudan is a party to several relevant international treaties prohibiting torture, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. These treaties are also an integral part of Sudan’s Bill of Rights. Sudan is therefore obliged to take measures aimed at preventing torture, responding to allegations of torture by
means of prompt, impartial and effective investigations and prosecutions, and providing effective remedies and reparation.

Over the last decade, national, regional and international actors have identified a series of problems in the Sudanese legislative and institutional framework and practice in relation to the prohibition of torture. However, the Government of Sudan has
not taken measures to effectively combat torture.

No anti-torture policy or coordinated efforts are in place that tackle the causes of
torture through legislative and institutional reforms or adequate responses in individual cases. Such a policy would need to be based on Sudan’s obligations under international law and its constitution. To this end, it would include the adequate prohibition of torture in Sudanese law, the provision of safeguards, as well as measures to ensure accountability and reparation. It would also benefit from the ratification of treaties to which Sudan is not yet a party, particularly the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Optional Protocol thereto, which provides for additional monitoring of the prohibition of torture.

Effectively combating the legacy of torture in Sudan, and the structural factors contributing to its persistence, requires fundamental reforms. Legislative reform, such as the adoption of an anti-torture law, is an important component of these broader reforms. Many aspects of Sudan’s laws fall short of international standards, and thereby facilitate torture and/or undermine if not negate accountability and reparation for this serious violations of human rights. The following is a brief summary of key areas of concern and recommendations as to what steps Sudan should take with a view to implementing the prohibition of torture by means of legislative reform:

Prevention

Sudanese criminal law does not contain a criminal offence of torture in line with the internationally recognised article 1 of the UN Convention against Torture. Provisions governing rape and sexual violence, including the absence of a criminal offence of female genital mutilation, are inadequate and fail to effectively repress gender-based violence against women.

Conversely, Sudanese criminal law and public order law recognise a series of corporal punishments, including stoning, amputations and whippings, which are contrary to the prohibition of torture under international law, as held by the UN Human Rights Committee and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

The Criminal Procedure Act provides some custodial safeguards. However, it does not stipulate a right of access to a lawyer of one’s choice from the beginning of criminal proceedings. Also, the prosecuting attorney can extend the initial 24 hours period of arrest to 96 hours, which is an unduly long period compared to the 24-48 hours that are widely seen as best practice.

The longer period enhances the risk of torture at a time when arrested and detained persons are known to be most vulnerable. The National Security Act (NSA) adopted in 2010 largely fails to address the concerns that had been expressed in respect of its predecessor, the 1999 National Security Forces Law. The Act gives National Intelligence and Security Services ( NISS) members the power to arrest and detain a person on vague grounds for an initial period of up to thirty days (45 days upon renewal) and a possible total of four and a half months. As detainees do not have an unequivocal right to communicate with family member or lawyers, and do not have the right to appear before a judge to challenge the legality of detention or lodge a complaint within the period set out above (up to four and a half months), they are frequently subject to incommunicado detention. Being cut off from the outside world considerably enhances vulnerability to being subjected to torture, and also constitutes a form of ill-treatment in its own right. The lack of substantial reforms of national security legislation constitutes a visible failure to enhance much needed protection against the well documented practices of torture and ill-treatment at the hands of NISS members.

There have been a number of recent cases, including death penalty cases, where Sudan’s Constitutional Court effectively dismissed allegations raised by defendants that confessions had been extracted under torture. This jurisprudence, which concerned cases where defendants had been held in prolonged incommunicado detention during which the risk of torture and ill-treatment is particularly evident,
fails to act as disincentive so that investigating authorities refrain from using torture to extract confessions or obtain evidence. These cases highlighted the shortcomings in legal protection provided by Sudanese laws against forced confessions.

Accountability

There has been almost complete impunity for torture, including acts of rape and sexual violence, in Sudan. A series of interrelated factors contribute to this impunity: lack of a criminal offence of torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence in line with international standards; immunities for officials; brief statutes of limitations; lack of victim and witness protection; and the absence of a system aimed at holding officials accountable for wrongdoing, i.e. by means of prompt, impartial and effective investigations and prosecutions. The granting of immunity is the most visible means of shielding alleged perpetrators from accountability. It reflects a system dominated by the executive at the expense of effective oversight, be it judicial or otherwise. This institutionalised lack of accountability is deeply engrained. Immunities were maintained in the Armed Forces Act of 2007, the Police Act of 2008, and the National Security Act of 2010, notwithstanding repeated calls to abolishimmunity laws by the UN Human Rights Committee, the African Commission, various UN Charter bodies, the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur and others. Immunities continue to act as
reassurance that officials are above the law, also because the judiciary, including the Sudanese Constitutional Court, have upheld such immunities in practice. This situation has frequently led to impunity, including for serious human rights violations, as legal remedies are neither clear nor effective. In addition, there is a lack of adequate protection of victims, witnesses and human rights defenders, which undermines the prospect of safely bringing complaints relating to torture.
By maintaining the current system, the state party fails in its positive obligation to prevent, investigate and prosecute serious violations, and to provide effective remedies to victims thereof.

Lack of effective remedies and reparation

There have been some isolated instances of out of court settlements in torture cases, and the Government of Sudan has agreed to provide some form of reparation in relation to the conflict in Darfur. However, in practice there is an almost complete absence of cases that have resulted in compensation or other forms of reparation being awarded to victims of torture. The law does not provide for an explicit right to reparation for torture. Immunities, short statutes of limitation and lack of adequate protection, in combination with systemic shortcomings that undermine effective access to justice, render existing remedies ineffective, a fact recognised by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in its jurisprudence. In addition, there are no effective national human rights institutions or administrative mechanisms providing at least some form of reparation for torture survivors.

Recommendations


In light of the above considerations, the Government of Sudan should urgently take a series of measures to ensure the effective implementation of the prohibition of torture:
Adopting an anti-torture policy designed to effectively prevent torture, based on legislative and institutional reforms, measures to ensure accountability and justice for torture victims, and a public commitment to refrain from any form of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. To this end, consider the adoption of an anti-torture law and/or targeted legislative reforms with a view to bringing legislation in line with Sudan’s obligations under international law:
Enshrining the unequivocal prohibition of torture and other inhuman or degrading or cruel treatment or punishment in the revised constitution;
Making torture a criminal offence in line with the definition of article 1 of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which has been widely recognised in international law, and stipulate punishments commensurate with the seriousness of the offence;
Removing the reference to adultery in article 149 of the Criminal Act (rape), enacting legislation that adequately criminalises other forms of sexual violence, including female genital mutilation, and making involvement of a public official an aggravating circumstance in case of rape and other sexual violence;
Ensuring adequate custodial safeguards in the Criminal Procedure Act, including access to a lawyer of one’s choice from the beginning of proceedings and the right to be brought before a judge within 48 hours;
Removing the power of the NISS to arrest and detain individuals; or reforming the National Security Act to ensure adequate custodial safeguards, including the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention, including incommunicado detention, access to a lawyer of one’s choice from the beginning of proceedings and the right to be brought before a judge within 48 hours;
Amending the 1993 Evidence Act to stipulate an unequivocal prohibition of using evidence extracted as a result of torture or other ill-treatment;
Removing barriers to accountability for torture by 
(i) repealing immunities provisions in the Armed Forces Act, the Police Act and the National Security Act; (ii) removing statutes of limitation for the offence of torture; and 
(iii) enacting laws providing adequate protection against threats, harassment and assaults on victims, witnesses and human rights defenders;
Enacting legislation providing for an explicit right to reparation for torture and related human rights violations, including effective access to justice;
Promoting a culture of accountability within the NISS, the police and the army by adopting codes of conduct prohibiting torture and ill-treatment, the breach of which is subject to disciplinary sanctions, and making human rights training an integral part of their curricula;
Establishing, by law, an independent oversight body vested with sufficient resources and mandated to investigate allegations of torture and ill-treatment in line with best practices, including the Istanbul Protocol;
Abolishing all forms of corporal punishment in Sudanese laws;
Ratifying the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Optional Protocol to the Convention.

II. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights:

Recommendations forming part of the Concluding Observations on Sudan’s 4th and 5th Periodic Reports, 2008-2012

The following are the recommendations contained in the Concluding Observations, the full text of the ACHPR’s concluding observations is available at
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/12th-eo/conc-obs/4thand5th-2008-2012/concluding_observation_.pdf:

The African Commission recommends that the Government of Sudan:

NISS [National Intelligence and Security]


1. Takes adequate measures in combating insecurity, violence, and police and law
enforcement excesses, especially those of the NISS.

2. Ensures that the conditions of arrest, preliminary interrogation and detention of
suspects comply with the principles of the Robben Island Guidelines.

Judiciary


3. Undertakes to train members of the judiciary at all levels, state prosecutors, and members of the bar, police and prison officials on human rights law.

4. Put in place the reforms to strengthen the judiciary especially as it relates to human rights training for judges.

Press Freedoms


5. Take the necessary measures that ensure freedom of expression and access to
information. Death Penalty and Torture and Cruel and Inhuman Treatment and

Punishment


6. In its next report provide the number of persons on death row.

7. To observe the moratorium on the death penalty and take measures for its total abolition.

8. Takes urgent and concrete measures to abolish laws that allow corporal punishment
including stoning, amputation, cross-amputation and whipping.

9. Should include standards like the Robben Island Guidelines in the human rights program of Sudan Police College and the training of prison officers.

10. Consider enacting a law criminalizing torture.

11. Appoints an independent commission to investigate all extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances and torture by the police and make public its findings.

National Security Act


12. Repeal Article 52(3) of the National Security Act 2010 that provides members of the NISS and their associates with immunity from criminal and civil procedures.

13. Takes immediate steps to close down all unofficial places of detention.

14. Adopts a holistic approach to prison decongestion and conditions of detention in the prisons, ensuring that the Prison Service get adequate resources, including funding to improve living conditions and access to health care in prisons and places of detention.

Women

15. Enacts legislation prohibiting female genital mutilations, violence and other discriminatory practices against women.

16. Takes measures to ensure female participation at all levels of decision making, including considering enacting a law on affirmative action.

17. In its next Periodic Report provides gender disaggregated data with its narrative Report.

18. Ratify the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.

19. Ratifies the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

20. Takes legislative and other measures that address rape in Sudan.

21. Takes measures that address the low level of literacy amongst the girl-child.

22. Enact a law that encourages and promote women’s participation in the political affairs of the State.

23. Takes measures to ban child labour and recruitment of child soldiers.

24. Should indicate the participation of NGOs in the preparation of its next Periodic Report.

25. Takes the necessary legislative measures and material preparations to extend free legal assistance to all crimes where the accused person cannot afford to pay legal representation fees.

26. Open up constructive dialogue, with the full involvement of the AU, with all factions of the various conflicts in Sudan, in particular South Sudan, in a bid to find a comprehensive solution to the problems in the country.

27. Ensure that the deportation of refugees within its territory conforms to international and regional human rights standards. It should explore measures such as voluntary repatriation, integration or resettlement as durable solutions for long standing refugees’ problems.

Ratification of International / Regional Instruments


28. Takes measures to ratify international and regional human rights instruments, including: the Convention Against Torture; the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Additional Protocol to the African Chart
er on Human and Peoples’ Rights on Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, and the African Union Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption; Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance.

29. Should undertake to make a declaration accepting the competence of the African Court under Article 34(6) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

30. Domesticates all the relevant regional and international instruments it has ratified in line with it international obligations.

Rights of Older Persons and the Disabled


31. In its next reporting period the report should outline how the rights of older persons and disabled people are protected.

General


32. Ensures that Sharia law is not applied to Christians and other non-Muslims groups.

33. Requests Sudan to respond to its request for Provisional Measures on Southern Kordofan.

34. In its next Periodic Report provide information on the measures taken by the authorities to deal with excesses of the police and other security agents.

35. Finally, the African Commission requests that the Republic of Sudan in its next Periodic Report inform the African Commission how it has implemented the recommendations in this

Concluding Observations.


Adopted at the 12th Extra-ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights held from 29 July to 4 August 2012, Algiers, Algeria
III. Selected Documents (January to May 2013)

United Nations 15 February 2013
Sudan: UN expert calls for further efforts to protect human rights after visit to Khartoum and Darfur


http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13001&LangID=EJanuary-May2013

Three UN Secretary-General reports on the situation in Abyei (S/2013/59, 15 Januar 2013; S/2013/198, 28 March 2013 and S/2013/299, 17 May 2013), two reports on the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (S/2013/22, 15 January 2013 and S/2013/225, 10 April 2013) and one report on South Sudan (S/2013/140, 8 March 2013)
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/sgreports/2013.shtml

Others


27 March 2013 | Amnesty International: 10 years on, Violence remains widespread in Darfurhttp://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/darfur_brief_-_10_years_on.pdf

27 February 2013 | African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, Human Rights Watch, Physicians for Human Rights and REDRESS: Sudan: Doctors perform amputations for courts End corporal punishment, reform laws http://www.redress.org/downloads/PR_Sudan_Doctors-Perform-Amputations-for-Courts_270213.pdf

12 January 2013 | Jok Madut Jok Mapping the Sources of Conflict and Insecurity in South Sudan: Living in Fear under a Newly-Won Freedom
http://suddinstitute.org/publications/show/mapping-the-sources-of-conflict-and-insecurity-in-south-sudan-living-in-fear-under-a-newly-won-freed/

HRW : ICC Suspect at Scene of Fresh Crimes



Sudan: ICC Suspect at Scene of Fresh Crimes

Surrender Ali Kosheib, Protect Civilians in Darfur

(Nairobi) – A Sudanese commander wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) led or participated in deadly attacks on ethnic Salamat communities in Central Darfur during April 2013, Human Rights Watch said today. Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that the attackers appeared to include government forces using government weapons and equipment.

Ali Kosheib, a former militia leader now in a high-ranking post with the auxiliary Central Reserve Police, faces a 2007 arrest warrant by the ICC for crimes against humanity and war crimes in West Darfur in 2003 and 2004. Although Sudanese authorities detained Kosheib, a nom de guerre for Ali Mohammed Ali, in 2007 on unrelated charges and again in 2008, they released him for lack of evidence.

The United Nations Security Council is to be briefed by the ICC prosecutor on June 5. The Security Council should call on Sudan to surrender Kosheib to the ICC immediately, Human Rights Watch said.

“Witnesses place Ali Kosheib at the scene of recent killing, burning, and looting in Darfur,” said Daniel Bekele, Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “This shows that allowing fugitives to remain at liberty can have a devastating price.”

Human Rights Watch interviewed more than 30 people, including refugees who fled the fighting, at the Chadian border in May.

Since early April, heavily armed members of the Misseriya and Ta’isha ethnic groups have conducted attacks on ethnic Salamat communities in and around Um Dukhun, Central Darfur. These attacks have killed more than 100 civilians, injured scores more, burned and destroyed property, and displaced tens of thousands of people. The fighting has since spread to South Darfur and has caused additional civilian deaths and destruction, which Human Rights Watch has not been able to document.

Witnesses placed Kosheib at the scene of an attack on the town of Abu Jeradil, 30 kilometers south of Um Dukhun, on April 8, riding in a government vehicle. They told Human Rights Watch that large numbers of heavily armed men, most wearing khaki uniforms, arrived in two phases, first on foot and then in vehicles. They shot indiscriminately, burned homes and shops, stole livestock, and looted goods.

“The [attackers] were shooting at shops and people,” an elderly man from Abu Jeradil told Human Rights Watch. “We saw houses and fields on fire as we fled.”

A 35-year-old woman who also fled said she returned the next day and found dead bodies: “Five in one place, four in another place, two women shot as they ran.”

Salamat men told Human Rights Watch they fought back using rifles but were far outnumbered and outgunned by the attackers, whom they identified as members of the Central Reserve Police, Border Intelligence, and militia. They said the attackers drove in a convoy of government land cruisers and were armed with rockets, anti-aircraft weapons, rocket propelled grenades, and other weapons. Human Rights Watch could not independently verify these descriptions.

As a result of the recent fighting and attacks, tens of thousands of people have been forced to flee the area, Human Rights Watch said. More than 30,000 refugees, mostly women and children, crossed into Chad, where they are living in dire conditions amid the onset of the rainy season. Although most are of Salamat ethnicity, non-Arab ethnic groups such as Masalit, Kajaksa, Fur, Dajo, and Tama also fled the fighting.

One Tama woman from Abu Jeradil told Human Rights Watch: “They didn’t see any difference between communities, they just wanted people to leave. They stole our cows and burned our crops and took our clothes from our house and burned the house down. We saw them.”

Government Response
Sudan’s government has repeatedly downplayed its responsibility for the violence in Darfur, saying it does not have the capacity to control inter-ethnic fighting. Inter-ethnic conflict over land and other resources has intensified in 2013, displacing more than 170,000 people in Darfur and Chad, according to UN estimates.

By all accounts the cause of the Um Dukhun area fighting is a land dispute between the Salamat and Ta’isha ethnic groups. However, Human Rights Watch research found that the government allowed state security forces and equipment to take part in the attacks and took no steps to protect civilians from the fighting.

The reason for the government’s support for one side in the fighting is not clear. Observers consulted by Human Rights Watch suggest that Sudanese leaders wanted to appease ethnic Misseriya and Ta’isha men who fought in pro-government “Janjaweed” militia forces during the the Darfur conflict in the mid-2000s, and consider the Salamat to be Chadian nationals.

Some people who fled the attacks told Human Right Watch the attackers had accused them of being “tora bora” or rebels against the government, suggesting another possible motivation for the attacks. Yet members of all ethnic groups involved in the fighting have reportedly joined various Sudanese rebel groups.

“The evident role of security forces in the Um Dukhun attacks indicates that serious crimes were committed with government knowledge,” Bekele said. “The authorities should fully investigate these crimes and hold all those responsible to account.”

Failure to Protect
Neither Sudan’s regular armed forces nor the African Union-United Nations peacekeeping force, UNAMID intervened to protect civilians from the April attacks in Darfur. While a few dozen Sudanese Armed Forces soldiers at Abu Jeradil remained in their barracks and provided protection to some civilians, many police and other security forces fled.

After the fighting began, Sudanese military officials sealed the area. They instructed the “forces mixtes,” the tri-partite force established by Sudan, Chad, and Central African Republic to monitor their shared border, to steer clear of the fighting, saying it was an internal matter, Chadian members of the force told Human Rights Watch.

Sudanese authorities also kept UNAMID from the area. They twice denied access on security grounds, then allowed one inter-agency visit to the town of Um Dukhun in late April but not to other affected areas or to the insecure border zone. The government’s refusal to allow UNAMID patrols also suggests government complicity in the attacks on civilians, Human Rights Watch said.

A large area currently remains insecure, with armed men from the attacking groups roaming freely, displaced villagers told Human Rights Watch. They said they feared returning to their villages to collect food or other belongings because of the presence of armed Misseriya in the border zone. Some of those who returned reported incidents of harassment, armed robberies, and sexual violence.

A woman from the village of Sawawih told Human Rights Watch that when she returned to her village weeks after the attack she found all the houses burned down and animals stolen. Armed men intercepted her group and detained them for two hours. “They ordered us to sit and pointed guns at us and asked, what is our tribe? Where are the men and why are they hiding in fear?”

The UN Security Council should condemn the attacks on civilians and request a report on these incidents from UNAMID, Human Rights Watch said. The council should remind the Sudanese government of its responsibility to protect its population and make clear that failure to surrender Kosheib to the ICC or prevent UNAMID troops from carrying out their mandate to protect civilians would result in individual sanctions.

“The Sudanese government’s claim that it cannot protect civilians from inter-ethnic fighting rings hollow when it denies access to peacekeepers who could help,” Bekele said. “Preventing the peacekeeping mission from carrying out its mandate only gives the impression Sudan is condoning the unlawful attacks.”

Background
A root cause of the fighting is a longstanding land dispute between the ethnic Arab Salamat and Ta’isha groups. The Salamat, who are also present in Chad, lived for decades under Ta’isha administration in South Darfur but in recent years sought their own native administration and the power to govern a specific area. Salamat leaders claim the former governor of West Darfur granted them a native administration, or nazirate, in 2010 with headquarters in Abu Jeradil.

Tensions between the two groups increased when the government created the state of Central Darfur in 2012, a move that appeared to consolidate Salamat power.

In late January, Kosheib, who is part Ta’isha, gave an incendiary speech at a market in South Darfur, accompanied by local government officials and ethnic leaders, stating that he was not just a Central Reserve Police commander but also a “Janjaweed” commander able to defend Ta’isha land, and calling on Ta’isha fighters to protect their land. The Central Reserve Police, known locally as “Abu Tira,” absorbed many former pro-government militias that have been implicated in abuses.

Salamat relations with neighboring Misseriya Arabs sharply deteriorated in early 2013 with a series of armed robberies of Salamat youth by alleged Misseriya. The Ta’isha and Misseriya joined forces and attacked dozens of Salamat towns and villages starting on April 5 at Biltebe. UN agencies estimate that attackers burned property in 24 villages.

The UN Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC in 2005. The court has issued arrest warrants for three Sudanese suspects in addition to Kosheib, all of whom are fugitives: President Omar al-Bashir; Ahmed Haroun, governor of Southern Kordofan state, and Abdulraheem Mohammed Hussein, the defense minister. In 2010, the ICC issued a formal finding of non-cooperation by the Sudanese government in the cases of Haroun and Kosheib, which was sent to the Security Council.

HRW Link

Thursday, 13 June 2013

Sudan: New evidence of scorched earth tactics against civilians in Blue Nile








Press releases
11 June 2013
Sudan: New evidence of scorched earth tactics against civilians in Blue Nile


New satellite imagery and eyewitness testimonies from rebel-held areas in Sudan’s Blue Nile State show that Sudanese military forces have resorted to brutal scorched earth tactics to drive out the civilian population, Amnesty International said in a report published today.

“We had no time to bury them”: War crimes in Sudan’s Blue Nile State documents how bombings and ground attacks by Sudanese military forces have destroyed entire villages, left many dead and injured, and forced tens of thousands to flee — with many now facing starvation, disease and exhaustion.

Evidence gathered by Amnesty International indicates that villages in the Ingessana Hills, an area held for a time by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army – North (SPLA-N) — endured multiple scorched earth offensives in 2012. Witnesses also described bombing attacks as recent as April 2013 that killed children and other civilians.

“This systematic and deliberate targeting of civilians follows a disturbing pattern that was used by the Sudanese government to devastating effect in Darfur,” said Jean-Baptiste Gallopin, Amnesty International’s Sudan researcher.

“Deliberately attacking civilians is a war crime. Given the scale, as well as the apparently systematic nature of these attacks, they may also constitute crimes against humanity.”

The report also describes how some people had to choose between carrying their children to safety or carrying their elderly parents.

“Faced with attack, aerial bombardment and the prospect of starvation, those who are physically able have little choice but to flee — often after making painful decisions about who among the weakest should be left behind,” said Jean-Baptiste Gallopin.

Some of those who were unable to run because of disability or age were burned alive in their homes; others were reportedly shot dead by Sudanese troops and pro-government militia. In addition, soldiers and militiamen looted valuable possessions, including livestock, before systematically setting fire to houses.

Awadallah Hassan, who fled from his village of Qabanit in the northwestern part of the Ingessana Hills, told Amnesty International:

“My grandmother Weret was blind and couldn’t run. [When we ran away] we thought someone had taken her ... [But] we went back to the village at 5pm and found Weret’s body completely burned. Her body was black.”

At least eight villages* in the Ingessana Hills were destroyed in this way and their inhabitants displaced. Witnesses also reported that a further nine villages** were burned down, although Amnesty International was unable to verify these claims.

The humanitarian situation of those remaining in rebel-held areas is dire. Because civilians are unable to tend their crops without fear of being bombed, food supplies are scarce. Displaced people told Amnesty International that they were often forced to live on poisonous roots that have to be soaked in water for days to become edible.

The organization documented more deaths from hunger, illness, and deprivation than as a direct result of the violence. Children and the elderly, the most physically vulnerable members of the population, are disproportionately hard hit.

The Sudanese government continues to block humanitarian relief to civilians in rebel-held areas.

“By taking the unconscionable decision to bar humanitarian aid, the Sudanese government is once again causing civilian deaths and suffering on a massive scale,” said Jean-Baptiste Gallopin.

“The international community has failed to enforce the International Criminal Court’s indictment of President Omar al-Bashir who is wanted on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Darfur. The ongoing violations in Blue Nile demonstrate yet again that it is civilians who pay the price when impunity for war crimes goes unchecked.”

The current violence in Blue Nile began almost two years ago, following the formal secession of South Sudan from Sudan. The Sudanese government is fighting the SPLA-N, a rebel group that emerged in 2011 when the Sudan People’s Liberation Army became the army of South Sudan.

The armed conflict in Blue Nile is closely linked with the conflict in Southern Kordofan but has received much less international attention due in part to the logistical difficulties of travelling to the area.

Amnesty International is calling on the government of Sudan to immediately end indiscriminate aerial bombings and deliberate ground attacks in civilian areas and to grant immediate access to humanitarian organizations.

“Both the UN Security Council and the African Union have been far too preoccupied with relations between Sudan and South Sudan to take effective action to stop the horrific events in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan,” said Jean-Baptiste Gallopin.

“The possibility of a long-term stalemate is extremely worrying. The international community must give this human rights crisis the attention it deserves.”
Amnesty International

المجرم عمر البشير .. جهل وعدم مسؤليه


المجرم عمر البشير .. جهل وعدم مسؤليه
أيمن عادل أمين عبد الله



أغلق الأنبوب ياعوض عباره تداولتها المواقع الإلكترونيه وشبكات التواصل حتي صارت مزحه عوض أقفل ، عوض أفتح عوض أفعل عوض ما تفعل ، أضحوكه يتجاذبها السودانيون ، بعد أن صار الرئيس البشير أضحوكه يتجاذب قراراته المجتمع الدولي وينظر لها بإستغراب لما تحتويه من جهل و عدم حكمه تتنافي مع عمر الرئيس السوداني الذي تجاوز العقد السادس ومازال يمارس نوع من المراهقه السياسيه تتناسب مع تاريخه الملطخ بسنوات الحرب و التدمير والقتل و الإغتصاب و التشريد و تمزيق الوطن و التفريط في جزء عزيز منه ..

لكثره التصريحات الغير مدروسه ، تأتي متوقعه لما يدور في السودان من تدهور بنيوي وإرتباك يسيطر علي أجهزه الدوله مما ينعكس في سلوكياتها وكيفيه تناولها للقضايا و إداره البلاد و التصابي غير المشروع في التحكم بمصائر الشعب السوداني و إدخاله في أزمات متواصله أثرت عليه وحملته ما يفوق طاقته الإحتماليه ودرجت علي تجاوز ما يصيبه من تأثيرات أي قرار غير مدروس ومدي إنعكاسه علي الواقع و الظروف الحياتيه ، لم يكن قرار الرئيس مفاجئ بل متوقع ومشابهه تماماً لسياسات الأرض المحروقه التي يتبناها نظام المؤتمر الوطني في إداره خلافاته، ومهد له الرئس الهارب عمر البشير في خطابه السابق بمناسبه إنسحاب الجبهه الثوريه السودانيه من أبوكرشولا .

كذلك إن التهاون المتبع من حكومه البشير في التعامل مع دوله الجنوب و الإستهانه بوضعيتها كدوله وشعب له إستقلاليته وسياساته المنفصله و التدخل في شانها الداخلي ينعكس سلباً علي المسار السليم لطبيعه العلاقه بين الدولتين ، وما تقضيه طبيعه الشعبين من ضروره تعاون وخلق علاقات مميزه.

وما تقوم به الحكومه ومحوله تحميل جوبا مسؤليه ضعفها وحروبها العرقيه التي تواصل فيها تغير مسار العلاقات الحميده لما تتميز به طبيعه العلاقه بين البلدين ، وأخيراً نصريحات الرئيس سلفاكير وحاله الإمتعاط التي إنتابته عقب زياره نافع وكرتي لجوبا والتي قال أنها إنحصرت فيما يخص الحرب في النيل الأزرق وجنوب كردفان وطلبت الحكومه السودانيه من جوبا طرد التجار السودانين الناشطين في المجال التجاري كخطوه في قطع الطريق أمام التطبيع بين البلدين و إستمرار الحكومه السودانيه في تضييق الخناق و الوقوف ضد المستثمرين وتسهيل عمليه التداول التجاري مما يعود بفائده علي البلدين ، و التلاسن المتبع من الرئيس السوداني ووصف الحركه الشعبيه بالحشره و إتهام جوبا رسمياً بدعم الجبهه الثوريه والتهديد المتواصل بقطع العلاقات ، وإرباك التفاوض بين البلدين و تهديد الإستقرار الإقتصادي و السياسي للبلدين كل هذا يزيد من الفرقه و الشتات و يخلق فراغ كبير في مسار العلاقات .

جاء القرار الرئاسي المفتقر لأبسط سمات الحكمه و الموضوعيه و المسؤليه يوضح حجم الإحباط والإنهزاميه الموجوده داخل المؤسسه العسكريه السودانيه ، و إلحاق المسببات بالأخرين هو أكبر دليل علي عدم قدره الحكومه السودانيه في الحفاظ علي أمن و إستقرار البلاد ، وخيبتها في كسب سند جماهيري لتعزيز موقفها السياسي بعد أن فتحت معسكرات الدفاع الشعبي وإبتدرت حمله إرجاع المفصولين للخدمه لخوض الحرب المعوجه ومحاولات الإعلام السوداني المأجور للحصول دعم شعبي وتأييد لموقف الدوله عبر ما ظل يبثه من برامج تعبويه ومحاوله تشكيل رؤيه وطنيه مشتركه في الحرب ضد التمرد و المرتزقه و الشعارات الفضفاضه التي يعج بها الإعلام المأجور لم تجد مكانها في التأثير علي رؤيه المواطن المنهك بتأثيرات القرار الرئاسي الغير المسؤل وما يتحمله هذا المواطن من زياده علي كافه الأصعده مربوطه بإرتفاع سعر الدولار مما تزيد من حجم المعاناه والإفقار .


قرار كهذا يوضح ميوعه القرارات الرئاسيه ويكشف الرئيس المجرم عن  فشله وجهله بالعهود و المواثيق وكيفيه التراجع عنها وفق ما تم الإتفاق عليه ،و الخطوات المترتبه علي القرارات الرئاسيه و كيفيه إتخاذها ، فالمسأله ليست فراسه أو شجاعه أو حمره عين بل هي دوله لها سياسات تنعكس سلباً أو إيجاباً علي مواطنيها تتخذ ما يلزم لإكمال هذه الإتفاقات و ما تقتضيه من شروط و حلول وفق ما جاء قي نصوصها ، لكن أن يفتقر الرئيس لكل هذا ويُلاسن من يُلاسن و يدعي علي الأخرين و يتخذ قرارت مفصليه تؤثر سلباً علي البلاد و إستقرارها اللإقتصادي هذا غير مقبول ويترتب علي الشارع السوداني دعم حمله ال100 يوم التي أطلقتها المعارضه لإسقاط النظام و الإبتعاد عن حاله الفرجه المستمره و التوقعات.



Saturday, 8 June 2013

ICC Urge Security council to take action



ICC Urge Security council to take action 


President Omar al-Bashir—wanted by the (ICC) on charges of genocide!





Security Council must urgently take action to end impunity in Darfur – ICC prosecutor


5 June 2013 – Deeply frustrated and disappointed by the Security Council’s failure to take any action against those responsible for war crimes in Darfur, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) stressed that the plight of the victims has meanwhile “gone from bad to worse.”

“We have done our part and it is up to this Council to live up to the legitimate expectations of Darfur’s victims, namely that individuals alleged to be responsible for their daily sufferings are brought to justice,” Fatou Bensouda told the 15-member body during a briefing this morning.

“These individuals are few among a population of millions who continue to endure untold daily suffering,” she declared, imploring Council members “to act with courage and conviction by adopting appropriate measures within its mandate to ensure that Sudan fugitives are brought to justice sooner rather than later.”

In 2005, the Security Council asked the Hague-based Court to investigate war crimes in Darfur after a UN inquiry found serious violations of international human rights law.

In March 2009, ICC judges issued arrest warrants against, among other top officials, Sudanese President, Omar Al-Bashir, for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Darfur. Mr. Bashir, along with the other ICC indictees in the country, has yet to be arrested.

Ms. Bensouda told the Council today that she was deeply concerned by the worsening situation in the region, as 300,000 people have been displaced in the first five months of this year alone, which exceeds the amount of displaced individuals in the last two years.

There have also been reports that indictees Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, also known as Ali Kushayb, Ahmad Harun and Abdel Raheem Hussein – all Government officials – have been involved in crimes against civilians this year, with Mr. Kushayb, leading an attack on the town of Aby Jeradil in April which left more than 100 civilians dead and displaced 30,000 people into Chad.

“Observers have suggested that the Government of the Sudan wanted to appease members of the Misseriya and Ta'isha tribes who participated in the Janjaweed/militia by helping them to seize the land of Salamat, considered by some to be Chadian nationals, and forcibly displacing them in the process,” she said, noting that her Office had been informed of many such incidents in that past.

“This is part of an ongoing pattern,” she declared.

“These alleged crimes are of concern to the international community and require urgent and concerted action. Again, this is a question of potential individual criminal responsibility, not of group or organizational responsibility,” Ms. Bensouda said.

“Regrettably, each briefing has been followed by inaction and paralysis within the Council, while the plight of victims of crimes committed in Darfur has gone from bad to worse,” she said, adding that the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war, hindering humanitarian access, and ongoing impunity have continued, causing despair among the population.

These few individuals must be prosecuted, Ms. Bensouda stressed, and noted that “as long as they enjoy impunity for the crimes they commit, they will continue to represent a threat to international peace and security.”

She noted that while there have been reports of prosecutions of rebels under Sudan’s anti-terrorism act, there have been no prosecutions of systematic crimes committed by Government forces. Working with regional actors such as the League of Arab States and the African Union (AU) could help address this challenge, and Ms. Bensouda called on the AU to implement the recommendations of its High-Level Panel on Darfur.

Although Sudan is not a State Party to the Rome Statute which established the ICC, it is obliged to cooperate with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor in accordance with a Council resolution adopted in 2005.

“We stand ready to continue doing our part, but time is long past due for this Council to act with courage and conviction by adopting appropriate measures within its mandate to ensure that Sudan fugitives are brought to justice sooner rather than later,” she concluded.

Call to Cancel Invitation of Nafie Ali Nafie


Call to Cancel Invitation by Obama Administration to Nafie, a Notorious Torturer and Genocidal Leader from Sudan


We believe the Obama Administration should cancel its invitation to Nafie Ali Nafie, a senior advisor to the Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir.

Nafie headed the National Intelligence and Security Service in Sudan, where he established the “ghost houses” of torture. During Darfur conflict, Nafie central role in orchestrating the Darfur genocide is well-known and indeed is even acknowledged by Nafie himself.

Nafie's invitation has been strongly criticized by Sudanese & Americans human rights activists, congressman Frank Wolf, holocaust scholars and genocide experts.

Nafie’s violation to human rights would suspend him from entering the US as per President Obama Official Proclamation in August 2011.

We feel strongly that inviting Nafie will only harm the US reputation as human rights defender.




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Ghost Houses Inventor visit to USA must cancel

Friday, 7 June 2013

هل يخفي الحظر الإنهيار و الفشل الحكومي ؟



هل يخفي الحظر الإنهيار و الفشل الحكومي ؟
أيمن عادل أمين عبد الله



إن الرؤيه الشائهه في تناول الخلاف السياسي هي ما تزيد من الإنهيار الكلي لمسأله الحريات في السودان ، و الرقابه المفروضه علي الحراك الفكري و الإجتماعي  ، والغياب الكامل للحريات العامه في السودان ظل ملازم السلطه الحاكمه منذ يومها الأول ، ومحاربه جميع التيارات الفكريه و السياسيه ذات النزعات المختلفه التي تشكل منظومه فكريه غالبه تعبر عن الراي العام الغالب لما تحتوي من توجهات مختلفه داخلياً تتفق علي عدم صلاحيه النظام الحاكم و ضروره إسقاطه ، وليست ببعيده عن الواقع السياسي الحقيقي كمؤسسات ذات قبول شعبي وجماهيري ، إكتسبت هذه الشرعيه من المواقف السياسيه المعارضه لسياسات النظام الحاكم رغم المحاولات المتواصله في إشراك هذه التيارات في الحكم وتبني المسؤليه بشكل جماعي ، ويظل النظام الحاكم في حاله تجريم و تكميم  للأفواه وترهيب فكري  تستراً علي إنهيار جبهته الداخليه  وتراخي قدرته علي المواجهه ورفض عام  لسياساته حتي داخل منظومته السياسيه المبنيه علي المصالح ، وفشل في إستقطاب سند جماهيري يعزز من موقفه العسكري و السياسي في حروبه من أجل البقاء و السيطره ، وإراقه المزيد من دماء الأبرياء و تقسيم ما تبقي من وطن ، بعد إن إشتعلت الحروب في كافه أطرافه منذره بإنفصال جديد ، جنوب آخر بذات السيناريو ، حرب لعينه و تجييش ديني و إستهداف عرقي 

  إن ما صرح الإتحاد العام للطلاب السودانين فيما يخص حظر نشاط الجبهه الثوريه في الجامعات السودانيه ، وما تقوم به الأجهزه الأمنيه بحظر صحيفه الميدان الناطقه بإسم الحزب الشيوعي السوداني هي وصايه علي عقول و توجهات البشريه حيث يرون في المعارضه السياسيه مرتعاً لغرس وصاياهم ، و إستغلال المنابر الإعلاميه المتاحه لهم منطلق لممارسه المطامع الذاتيه  ولتحريض العناصر الأمنيه ضد الطلاب المعارضين أو القوي السياسيه و منابرها ، يعد هذا نقل الحرب داخل المؤسسات التعليميه ، وفق قرارات ونزوات تقود لردود أفعال غير محسوبه العواقب  
   ، لا سيما بعد الفشل في كسب شرعيه وتضامن شعبي لذا الأساليب الرخيصه هي الأداه المستخدمه لاغرض الهيمنه و السيطره  وفرض السلطه المطلقه بالقوه و العنف ، والإتحاد العام للطلاب السودانين هو ذراع أمني وصنيعه حكوميه لا تمتلك أي شرعيه نقابيه ، ولاتجد القبول و الإعتراف من الطلاب و التنظيمات الطلابيه التي تعي دور هذا الإتحاد و الأجنده السياسيه الموجهه وما يسعي لفرضه ، بل قامت هذه التنظيمات الطلابيه الديمقراطيه بإنشاء جسم طلابي شرعي ضم في داخله الإتحادات الوطنيه كممثل شرعي وديمقراطي للطلاب السودانين ، لكن درجت السلطه الحاكمه في السودان منذ مجيئها لتفريغ الاوعيه الطلابيه و النقابيه من محتواها و السيطره عليها لإحداث تغيير وتحييد زائف قادر علي خدمه مصالحها وسياساتها وتظهر فعاليته في موقف كهذا 

الجامعات السودانيه أو حركه الطلبه جزء لا يتجزاء من حركه المجتمع سياسياً و إجتماعياً بل تساهم بشكل كبير في شد الإنتباه و التعبير المباشرفي الرفض و القبول للتغييرات المجتمعيه ، بل تشغل دور كبير لا سيما فيما يتعلق بالقضايا الوطنيه والتوعيه بها  وتنميه الوعي الشبابي وعزله عن السلبيه المسيطره علي المجتمع ، وللحركه الطلابيه  السودانيه إسهاماتها المعروفه في حركه التغيير السياسي التي أحدثت إنتفاضتي أكتوبر و أبريل  ، و لا تنفصل المنابر الطلابيه عن الواقع السياسي العام ، وتأتي مواقف التنظيمات الطلابيه  أشد وضوح و أكثر موضوعيه ومواجهه من القوي السياسيه .

إن قرار كهذا هو دعوه للعنف ضد الطلاب الديمقراطيين و عضويه التنظيمات الطلابيه المعارضه مما يزيد من الخطر ويبشر بعداء قبيح ستشهده الجامعات السودانيه ونقل الحرب لمقاعد الدراسه ورساله للأجهزه الأمنيه لمواصله  العنف الموجه ضد أبناء دارفور وجبال النوبه ومواصله في الإستهداف الواضح ضدهم ، بعد الأحداث التي شهدتها  جامعه الجزيره وما حدث لطلاب المدارس الثانويه في نيالا و التعدي المتواصل لطلاب المؤتمر الوطني علي منابر الجبهه الثوريه في الجامعات وكل القوي الساسيه المعارضه .

حاله الرعب  الحكومي من الصحافه و السيطره الأمنيه المضروبه عليها  وإختزال دورها الطبيعي و الرقابه عليها بهذا الشكل المقزز و محاوله إذلال الصحفيين المتواصله و ما يقوم به الرقيب الأمني المعين من جهاز الأمن السوداني لمتابعه وقراءه الصحف وتحديد ما قد يصلح للنشر، هو داب الديكتاوتوريات بشكل عام ولكن ما تستحدثه الحكومه من أساليب قمعيه أكثر مما سبق ينعكس عليها بشكل سلبي ويقلل من فاعليتها  ، فالسيطره علي المنابر الإعلاميه وحجبها و تغيبها عمداً ، وما تتعرض له الصحافه السودانيه منذ الإستقلال من مصادره وملاحقه ماواصله للصحفيين قد أثر بشكل كبير علي إستقرارها وتطورها ساهم في عدم وجود مؤسسه إعلاميه ضخمه قادره علي مواحهه التحديات و التحولات السياسيه مثل كثير من الدول ،إن المؤسسات الإعلاميه الأن في حاله تغييب أكثر من الفترات السابقه وتمر بظروف أكثر قسوه وإستهداف منظم شمل التدخل المباشر في عزل و بقاء القاده ورؤساء التحرير ، و إستهداف الملاك والتهديد المباشر بإلغاء التراخيص لمزواله العمل ، وحجب الصحيفه من الصدور بعد طباعتها يُكبد المؤسسات خسائر ماديه كبيره ، أضافه لما تعانيه من ضعف الماده الإعلانيه كإستهداف منظم لإنهاك الصحف إقتصادياُ  ، وهي سلسله من الموانع لا تحصي.

لكن هل  التحكم في مصائر البشريه  و توجهاتها ورؤاها قادر أن يخفي العيوب و الدماء المسكوبه علي الأرض ؟  وهل  الحظر المفروض علي الاحزاب و المنابر الطلابيه و الصحف يُخفي عوره المشانق  و يسكت أصوات الأطفال و النساء و النازحين ؟  إن المسافه تزداد إتساعاً و الحكومه في  أبراجها المشيده  من دماء البشر غارقه في الفشل و العزله و الرفض الجماهيري ، حولت الحياه لحجيم من الفوضي و النزوات و قوانين الغاب .